The moral residue of conservation.

Author information

1: Department of Forest Ecosystems and Society, Oregon State University, 321 Richardson Hall, Corvallis, OR, 97331, USA.
2: Centre for Compassionate Conservation, School of Life Sciences, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW, 2007, Australia.

Abstract

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are tradeoffs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume one of two possible answers: the act in question is right, or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a "moral residue," which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. In this essay we introduce the concept of moral residue, offering three philosophical accounts to explain its origins and implications, and illustrating each with a conservation example. We argue that moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and we suggest grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make.

TimAllenMDJD

Saturday, January 25, 2020