From Yale: Neurologic disorder and criminal responsibility

Handb Clin Neurol. 2013;118:345-56. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53501-6.00029-9.

Neurologic disorder and criminal responsibility.

Yaffe G.

Source

Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, USA. Electronic address: gideon.yaffe@yale.edu.

Abstract

Sufferers from neurologic and psychiatric disorders are not uncommonly defendants in criminal trials. This chapter surveys a variety of different ways in which neurologic disorder bears on criminal responsibility. It discusses the way in which a neurologic disorder might bear on the questions of whether or not the defendant acted voluntarily; whether or not he or she was in the mental state that is required for guilt for the crime; and whether or not he or she is deserving of an insanity defense. The discussion demonstrates that a just determination of whether a sufferer from a neurologic disorder is diminished in his or her criminal responsibility for harmful conduct requires equal appreciation of the nature of the relevant disorder and its impact on behavior, on the one hand, and of the legal import of facts about the psychologic mechanisms through which behavior is generated, on the other.